Theodor Adorno's concept of 'natural history' [Naturgeschichte] was central for a number of Adorno's theoretical projects, but remains elusive. In this essay, I analyse different dimensions of the concept of natural history, distinguishing amongst (a) a reflection on the normative and methodological bases of philosophical anthropology and critical social science; (b) a conception of critical memory oriented toward the preservation of the memory of historical suffering; and (c) the notion of 'mindfulness of nature in the subject' provocatively asserted in Max Horkheimer and Adorno's Dialectic of Enlightenment.These strands are united by the notion of transience and goal of developing a critical theory sensitive to the transient in history. The essay concludes by suggesting some implications of an expanded concept of natural history for issues in the discourse theory of Jürgen Habermas.
philosophical texts; (b) the demand for a non-systematic philosophy that would embrace the principle of the historical or textual fragment both in its form and its application; (c) the tangled and claustrophobic conceptual mirror-play of Adorno's later philosophical exegeses, culminating in Negative Dialectics, which sought to wring a faint sense of some utopian residue lying outside of conceptual thought, through the most extreme performance of conceptual self-scrutiny. Under certain presuppositions about the tenor of Adorno's later work, Naturgeschichte certainly also implies; (d) a pervasive and ultimately paralysing sense of dread and helplessness in the face of a homogenous and virtually irresistible history of domination, and a corollary sense of capitulation at the vision of world history as continuous catastrophe; and, (e) the most distinctive but perhaps least remarked-on aspect of Adorno's thinking, that is, his singular ability to endow even the most abstract of his subjects with an emotional charge, an affective dimension of feeling (of sadness, or disappointment, or yearning, or some synthesis of these three for which there is no precise name) that renders virtually all of his texts 'subjective' even when methodological objectivity would have been most demanded, and contributes, in large measure, to that quality of Adorno's own work that he described as the inner resistance to 'summarisation'; a quality that now, a quarter century after his death, also appears as the difficulty in contemporary appropriations of the methodological innovations and critical strategies that might still offer powerful challenges and resources to contemporary problems in the critical theory of society.
After a brief reading of the concept of natural history in Adorno's early eponymous essay: (I) I will try to distinguish the different valences of the concept of natural history, levels that we need to analyse separately if we are to see how the concept operates on the level of methodology; (II) I will then propose that, if we distinguish these levels, we will see that what Adorno has in mind with the concept of natural history is in effect a kind of strategy for the synthesis of methodological and normative considerations; a formal challenge to the question of methodological objectivity in philosophy and the social sciences, on the one hand, and existential-phenomenological versions of temporality and historicity on the other. I will describe natural history as the research protocol for the social scientific encounter with historical contingency: a research protocol that Adorno himself never ultimately fulfilled.
In a concluding section, (III) I will try to apply these conclusions to the state of contemporary (Habermasian) critical theory, arguing that in questions of the relation between normative theory and philosophical anthropology and in the discourse-theoretical evacuation of conceptions of memory-Adorno's concept of natural history presents both a formidable criticism and important intellectual resources.
I
I turn first to the 1932 essay, "The Idea of Natural History," in which the context of discussion is the age-old quarrel concerning the relation of historical experience and historical knowledge to a supposedly eternalised ahistorical essence; the more immediate context is the success of Heidegger's attempts to overcome this dualism by describing the essence of Dasein as itself historicity. The idea of natural history is introduced as a critique and corrective of the perspective of Being and Time. Adorno's main purpose, initially, is a dialectical one: he wants to demonstrate that the concepts of 'nature' and 'history' cannot be regarded as ontological essences without idealising them and rendering them into mythical self-parodies. History and nature are concepts that mutually and dialectically define one another, and can 'flip' into their other at the moment of their most extreme conceptual formulation. Nature, conceived initially and statically as that which lies beyond thought and resists it as origin and ground, appears as timeless, that is, under the idea of mythical repetition, blind fate, and unthinkability, just as history, cut from the idea of nature as a wholly human process of self-constitution, appears as ceaseless innovation and the production of the new.
Both of these perspectives are of course untenable, and Adorno's suggestion here is to ask what happens-what perspective emerges-if one is able to allow each concept to develop, in its extreme formulation, to its other. "If the ques-The idea of natural history, then, is first formulated as a methodological suggestion for a new form of critical historiography that will no longer be beholden to the traditional idealistic versions of timeless nature and historical progress, but will question the very terms of historical research by proposing to investigate precisely that region where historical events, by virtue of their very nature as time-bound and singular-as objects of a critical memory-come to appear as the operations of nature, while nature itself, in turn, is criticised as a figure of timelessness only insofar as it is linked to the social practices and rational inquiries of humans.
It is not just the purely intellectual, dialectical activity of de-familiarising these two terms that interests Adorno. He is also trying to describe the peculiar productivity that occurs as a consequence of this process. Nature and history, de-familiarised, coalesce into natural history, which is something very different, a perspective that Adorno explicates with references to the preMarxist works of Lukács (Theory of the Novel) and Benjamin (Origin of the German Mourning-Play). One way of expressing this is to resort to a traditional language of epistemology: nature and history are concepts and as such refer to a range of human practices of the organisation of otherwise disparate sets of empirical experiences. If dialectically fused into their 'zero point' of indifference, however, these two concepts generate an idea, which is a modality of concept with no correlate in any given experience, and in fact, according to an epistemological claim borrowed from the preface of Benjamin's book on baroque drama, also, contra Kant, has no regulatory function for the acquisition of new experience either. On the contrary, it appears 'idea' here synthesises dialectically opposed concepts in such a way that, while remaining a sub-species of concept, it has the opposite function of disintegrating or deorganising what is given (or what wants to be given) in experience. 2 The idea of natural history realises its truth-content through its capacity to degrade or disrupt the appearance of what is 'given' in experience, insofar as what is given is in itself a reflection of a false totalisation of the ensemble of social and material conditions specific to a given socio-economic constellation. In a departure from this parasitic use of the traditional language of epistemology, however, and an (equally parasitic) use of the language of phenomenology, Adorno will conclude that the idea of natural history amounts to a degradation of experience as a perspective, or a way of seeing.
Adorno contends that the dialectical crossing-point of nature and history constructs a particular optics. Natural history, for Adorno, is the attempt to essay "The Actuality of Philosophy," are not to be regarded as providing 'solutions' to problems posed by the assemblage of recovered cultural material. Rather, such solutions are to be regarded as directions toward a political practice that would seek to dissolve the puzzle-like character of the real, rather than merely solving it. Firmly refusing any crypto-theological speculations in which the truth-content generated from acts of construction is referred to some substantiality beyond the phenomenal, Adorno insists that critical construction is linked with praxis:
He who interprets by searching beyond the phenomenal world for a world in itself which forms its foundation and support, acts mistakenly like someone who wants to find in the riddle the reflection of a being which lies behind it, a being mirrored in the riddle, in which it is contained. Instead, the function of riddle solving is to illuminate the riddle-Gestalt like light-ning, and to sublate it, not to persist behind the riddle and imitate it.
Authentic philosophical interpretation does not meet up with a fixed meaning which already lies behind the question, but lights it up suddenly and momentarily, and consumes it at the same time.
11
Regardless of how we might assess the success of this claim to establishing a connection to praxis, 12 Adorno's firm conviction here is of the connectionin fact the identity-of the recovery of the singular, the historically contingent, and the transient, and the broader aims of unmasking critique:
Just as riddle solving is constituted, in that the singular and dispersed elements of the question are brought into various groupings long enough for them to come together into a figure out of which the solution springs forth, while the question disappears-so philosophy has to bring its elements, which it receives from the sciences, into changing constellations . . . into changing trial combinations, until they fall into a figure which can be read as an answer, while at the same time the question disappears.
the vision of its products and projects freezing into natural things; bodies that decay and die. Transience, as a perspective, concentrates on the singular, wholly contingent fragment of historical experience, and Adorno's insistence that such fragments be taken as ciphers or clues to some otherwise wholly inaccessible dimension of historical truth is, at this point at least, entirely Benjaminian-as are the virtually insurmountable problems entailed by the effort to expand theoretically on the possibilities of a logic of 'constructing constellations', problems that would, shortly after the "Natural History" lecture, lead to a deep rift between Benjamin and Adorno.
and concrete provides the chance for a glimpse into an alternative history, a recovery of a different, critical form of recollection.
II
With this in mind we can perhaps usefully distinguish amongst three different if intimately related dimensions of the 'shocking' effect of the concept of natural history, along with the revisions in the theories of history and time consciousness that they would support. In distinguishing these three levels, or better, interlocking strategies for temporal re-visioning, I hope to suggest the extent to which the perspective of natural history entails the adoption of a critical theory of recollection, or at least demands the attempt to formulate one. Adorno was particularly sensitive to this dialectic, in which science re-enchants its subject matter by appropriating its own self-defining stories and recasting them in temporal terms that can be told only from its own perspective: withdrawn from the subject, constituted by the subject, in the very act of subjective self-creation. Hence, origin recedes from the yearning gaze of subjectivity to the degree that it is approached. Once again, the present projects its own past; the new generates its other as archaic. 19 While it is tempting to read the book in this eerily Foucauldian light from time to time, though, it seems to me that a postmodern synchrony (and the concomitant release of otherwise diachronously law-like and ordered relationships into a free space of contingency) is precisely not what Horkheimer and Adorno achieve in Dialectic of Enlightenment; rather, the dissolving of diachrony that their strangely self-cancelling genesis narrative performs tends far more toward a strange kind of anachronism, a complication rather than an evaporation of time.
(b) Natural History as the Critical Memory of Historical Suffering
What I mean by this can best be seen in another dimension of the optics of natural history: a powerful normative insight that seems all the more star- What is less clear is the sense in which 'transience' already constitutes a normative category. That which is transient is that whose individuality consists entirely in its status as about-to-go, whose presence, as it were, already can only be defined by its absence. In this sense, transience is the particular fate of historical entities, which, in their fungibility and replaceability, are historical entities precisely and only insofar as they pass into history: their essence has been supplanted by their impending non-existence. What is transient is that which has been so converted into material that it loses any claim to distinction, and merely marks time. Transitoriness, in other words, is a temporal relation that is always constituted retrospectively, which is to say that that which is transient is that which, as it turns out, can no longer be remembered, This position leads to the possibility of a critical-materialist theory of temporality, of the social construction of time according to concrete material conditions; at the heart of any such theory would stand the status of the commodity as a tension-laden temporal structure. 26 A third possibility is the development of a theory of intergenerational justice; or, as in the later work of Max
Horkheimer, an attempt to derive moral insights from the very impossibility of such intergenerational justice. 27 Moral indignation at the irredeemability of past suffering evaporates the utopian dimension of critical theory:
memory of past suffering cannot be reconciled with a future present of emancipation conceived of as fulfilment. But a strong tradition within first generation Critical Theory identified just this situation as a motor for critical insight and political engagement. While never adequately developed (while certainly never even approaching the level of a 'theory' of memory, which at this point would appear to be virtually the only thing required), this notion of Eingedenken crystallises the normative claim of the concept of natural history, for it demands that we take seriously the possibility that the only possible convergence of subjectivity, and that which lies outside it, other than the self-consuming and inherently violent dialectic of self-assertion through self-identification, of conceptualisation through eating, is in effect an anamnestic one. 30 Eingedenken refers to the capacity of the subject to allow thought to be permeated with that which it is not without this provoking an allergic abreaction; conversely (a reversal built into the grammatical ambiguity of the formula Eingedenken der Natur im Subjekt), this unknown faculty also refers to the possibility that nature could allow itself to be contacted without reverting, in the very process, to a form of myth: 'Thinking,' reads the bad news of Dialectic of Enlightenment, "in whose mechanism of compulsion nature is reflected and persists, inescapably reflects its very own self as its own forgotten nature-as a mechanism of compulsion." 31 Hence the structural ambiguity in Horkheimer and Adorno's account when it comes to describing the possibility of some alternative or escape from this inescapable mechanism. The eccentric term Eingedenken splits the difference amongst several possibilities, since it might refer to an act or even a faculty of remembering, of recuperating a past experience in the form of a mental representation [Erinnerung]; or might just as well hint at some vaguer capacity that could, as Benjamin thought, be described in terms of a mimetic faculty that has been walled over in the course of historical time; or might just as well be defined only negatively as a pervasive sense of having forgotten something unrecoverable, which now presses on the limits of subjective consciousness without ever reaching the force of a Proustian involuntary memory or a Freudian-style Aha-Erlebnis, the two models of supersubjective, shattering-redeeming memory on which this period, so intent in any case on the phenomenon of personal memory, seems to have fixated.
Eingedenken, which is most frequently translated as 'mindfulness', seems to invite all these possibilities; in any event, the paradox on which all these rest is also encoded in the word, since to speak at all of an Eingedenken of nature in the subject is to refer at least implicitly to the possibility of remembering what has been forgotten: in this case not just the suffering of history, but of the very act of having forgotten it in the first place. To speak of Eingedenken is to remember that one once had it, which entails the remembering of the historical loss of memory; what on the surface appears a logical cul-de-sac.
To remember the forgetting of historical suffering is, however, apparently the task that the truly reasonable moment of enlightenment has left to accomplish; like the fragment "Le Prix du Progres," the introduction of Eingedenken at the end of the introductory chapter of Dialectic of Enlightenment takes this as its goal: once again, the notion of historical progress is opposed to the material suffering that underwrites it, and the purely moral task of reason is to find a way of thinking back into the image of history, under the sign of transience, all that which is historical precisely by not being remembered.
Just as in the Benjaminian conception, the concept of natural history calls for the vision of human history as a Leidensgeschichte. The 'entities' that appear in it under the sign of transience are persons about whom we only know that they are immemorable, not because they are not empirically remembered but because they are committed to an historical span which is dedicated to ensuring that they are not remembered, since it has no mechanism for coping with suffering in history (in fact suffering as history) save for its efficient elimination.
This sort of recovery project is, in Dialectic of Enlightenment and other of
Adorno's works often related to the critique of the 'effacement' or forgetting of death in modern society. For example, the notes to the former work will mention a 'theory of ghosts' (a passage certainly more Horkheimerian that Adornian) that castigates the incapacity of modern subjects to cope with the death of others as a symptom of the progressive tendency toward the fragmentation of life and memory as such:
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The disturbed relationship with the dead-forgotten and embalmed-is one of the symptoms of the sickness of experience today. One might almost say that the notion of human life as the unity in the history of an individual has been abolished: the life of the individual is defined only by its opposite, destruction, but all harmony and all continuity of conscious and involuntary memory have lost their meaning. 32 As the moral dimension of natural history, Eingedenken is meant to disclose the world as a Leidensgeschichte. Disclosive memory-that is the only thing to call it at this point-does not 'rescue' or 'redeem' past suffering, unless we simply choose to use these religiously freighted words to refer to the per- Given the ultimate fate of the natural history concept in Adorno's own work, as we shall see, this interpretation remains largely, albeit incompletely, justified. Proust's sensitivity to the sign of transience leads him to the heroic effort to transform the very images of transience themselves (which are always linked to suffering) with a tremendous desire for happiness, which for Adorno appears to be something like the recuperation of an absolute presence or the birth of an absolute present:
The polarity of happiness and transience directs [Proust] to memory.
Undamaged experience is produced only in memory, far beyond immediacy, and through memory, aging and death seem to be overcome in the aesthetic image. But this happiness achieved through the rescue of an image, a happiness that will not let anything be taken from it, represents the unconditional renunciation of consolation. Rather the whole of life be sacrificed for complete happiness than one bit of it be accepted that does not meet the criterion of utmost fulfilment. This is the inner story of the Remembrance of Things Past. Total reminiscence is the response to total transience, and hope lies only in the strength to become aware of transience and preserve it in writing. 
III
Adorno's concept of natural history begins as a programmatic proposal for an alternative methodology for critical sociology; it ends in a theory of aesthetic modernity. That was Adorno's trajectory; it need not be the trajectory of the concept of natural history itself. The elements I have sketched above comprise challenges and resources-problems and opportunities-for the discursive model of critical social theory. In this concluding section, I will make some suggestive comments on how these problems and opportunities can be taken.
Habermas' discourse-theoretical revision of critical theory is in very large measure, a stage in a longer relationship between philosophy and philo- See Pensky, Melancholy Dialectics, chapters 3 and 6. 16 Adorno, "The Idea of Natural History," p. 122. On this question see the classic essay by Christian Lenhardt, "Anamnestic Solidarity:
The Proletariat and its Manes," Telos 25, 1975, pp. 133-154 , which is widely misread as arguing for a theologically-tinged conception of memory as an end in itself;
in fact Lenhard's far more radical argument was the appropriation of the memory of unredeemed suffering of a past generation as a motor for revolutionary politics.
